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Abstract
Narrowband IoT (NB-IoT) is a new and attractive low
power wide area cellular technology for low-capability and
low-cost IoT devices, that is starting to see real-world de-
ployments. NB-IoT devices are expected to operate unat-
tended, potentially in inaccessible and signal-challenged lo-
cations, for at least 10 years on a single battery charge, mak-
ing the NB-IoT device energy consumption significantly im-
portant. Despite the importance of their function, the com-
munication protocols have largely been copied from older
generations of cellular networks to preserve interoperability,
without considering their specific characteristics and needs.
In this paper, we perform a detailed energy consumption
analysis for NB-IoT devices, that we use as a basis to de-
velop an energy consumption model for realistic energy con-
sumption assessment. Finally, we take the insights from our
analysis and propose optimizations to significantly reduce
the energy consumption of NB-IoT devices in different traf-
fic conditions. These optimizations are also complementary
to current 3GPP optimizations towards the 10-year battery
goal, and assess their performance.
1 Introduction
Narrowband IoT (NB-IoT) [42] is a new cellular net-
work technology, which is intended to cater to large num-
bers of stationary, low-power IoT devices deployed over a
wide area [23], such as sensors and meters, placed in signal-
challenged locations (e.g. basements, bridge foundations
etc.) Although other proposed technologies (e.g., LoRa,
SigFox) target similar devices, the licensed nature of NB-
IoT that allows for limited interference, the open standards
it implements and the improved coverage [43] make NB-
IoT technology a major candidate for future IoT support,
with several network operators already deploying commer-
cial NB-IoT networks.
Due to their nature, physical access to these devices is
likely to be difficult, which necessitates that they have the
ability to operate for 10 or more years on a single battery
charge [43]. However, these devices are expected to cost
less than $5 [23], which precludes the usage of high capacity
batteries. As such, it is vitally important that NB-IoT net-
work protocols are designed with device energy efficiency
as a central goal.
In this paper we show that, despite recent enhancements
(e.g. extended Discontinuous Reception (eDRX), Power
Saving Mode (PSM)), the current NB-IoT protocols are not
efficient enough to achieve the desired battery life goal. Fur-
thermore, we argue that many of the inefficiencies of the
current protocols stem from the fact that they have been
directly inherited by the LTE and 5G designs, which tra-
ditionally focused on Human-Type-Communication (HTC)
devices (phones, tablets), without much concern for energy
efficiency, as they can be recharged often. Additionally,
they have been optimized to cater to HTC traffic patterns
and use cases (long connections uniformly spread over time,
mainly downlink traffic). In contrast, NB-IoT devices typi-
cally exhibit very short connections in frequent, periodic in-
tervals [21], and existing procedures can incur a dispropor-
tionate energy overhead in relation to the actual data com-
municated.
This paper makes three key contributions:
1. We perform a thorough experimental measurement of
the power consumption of each individual operation
that a NB-IoT device performs under normal use (e.g.,
Random Access, Attach, encryption), using three dif-
ferent commercial NB-IoT devices. These operation-
specific measurements offer significantly greater insight
than prior works that only measure the total power
consumption [34], or just the data exchange energy
cost [35, 51], as they allow us to unearth potentially in-
efficient areas of the NB-IoT protocols, and can guide
us towards effective optimizations. They also show a
large deviation from the energy consumption assump-
tions published by 3GPP [3] as well as other works [15],
which can greatly affect studies that rely on them (e.g.,
[34]). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
for NB-IoT devices that measures each operation in iso-
lation.
2. Building on the above characterization, we present an
Figure 1. Communication process in NB-IoT.
NB-IoT energy consumption model, which we use to
simulate the battery life of a device under realistic traf-
fic conditions [21] and factoring in collisions and signal
degradation. This gives us an estimate of the battery ca-
pacity requirements to meet the 10 year goal for differ-
ent coverage scenarios, and we find that it is far from re-
alizable with current practices and previously proposed
approaches, given a $5 cost constraint. We also use our
model to compare against prior work that do not take
all operations into account, and assess the overall en-
ergy consumption difference. We show that operations
ignored by prior works (e.g., [15]) can have a significant
energy cost, and it is imperative they are considered and
optimized to lower the device energy consumption.
3. We propose two novel mechanisms that exploit the sta-
tionary and periodic nature of NB-IoT devices, and
substantially reduce device energy consumption (up to
37.8%), while at the same time free up network re-
sources. Furthermore, we discuss a set of best prac-
tices under the existing protocols, that device vendors
and network operators should consider in order to max-
imize battery life.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides the essential background. Section 3 presents de-
tailed energy consumption measurements with three com-
mercial NB-IoT devices. In section 4 we present our en-
ergy consumption model and a simulation-based study to
assess the battery requirements of NB-IoT devices. Sec-
tion 5 presents our energy optimization mechanisms along
with best practices, and evaluates their energy performance
against baseline approaches. Section 6 discusses the related
work. We conclude in section 7.
2 Background
2.1 Communication Process
In NB-IoT (like in LTE), whenever a device wishes to
transmit new data and does not have an active connection
with the network, it needs to follow the connection estab-
lishment procedure (Fig. 1(a)). This procedure is made up
from the the Random Access (RA) and the Attach processes.
To establish a connection, the device begins to scan the air
interface for a suitable network to connect to, and synchro-
nizes with it in the downlink direction (i.e. from the network
to the device). Afterwards, the Random Access (RA) pro-
cess is followed to gain synchronization in the uplink (i.e.
from the device to the network) and request resources for
transmission, which begins with the preamble transmission
by the device. For each identified preamble, the Base Station
(BS) replies with a Random Access Response (RAR) mes-
sage, that contains an uplink grant for the next transmission,
and the device-specific Timing Advance (TA) value to con-
trol subsequent uplink transmissions (i.e. how much time in
advance the device needs to start transmitting, so that the BS
receives the signal at the correct time). Next, the BS resolves
possible collisions that might have happened at the preamble
transmission stage, and selects the devices that are allowed
to proceed with the connection establishment process. The
devices then need to follow the Attach process, to establish
a connection with the core network, generate a security con-
text, and set up data and signalling radio bearers (DRBs and
SRBs, respectively). At the end of the Attach process the
device can exchange data at will.
To increase the probability of signal reception in signal-
challenged locations, NB-IoT specifies three different cov-
erage levels, normal, robust and extreme that use different
number of repetitions (up to 128 and 2048 repetitions for the
uplink and downlink respectively), which can either be de-
coded separately, or they can be combined to further increase
the reception probability.
After the data transmission, devices remain connected to
the network for a specific amount of time (called herein as
active waiting). This feature was initially designed for HTC
devices, in order to avoid having to repeat the connection es-
tablishment process when the devices exchange data within
short periods of time. The duration of the active waiting is
defined by the inactivity timer (IT) [8], which is network
operator specific (10-50 seconds in most commercial net-
works).
Upon expiration of the IT, the network releases the con-
nection, and the device switches to an idle (light sleep) state,
with lower energy consumption, requiring the device to re-
peat the connection establishment process when it wishes to
transmit data again. If data arrives while the device is in the
idle state, the network uses the paging procedure to notify
the device. The frequency that the device checks for paging
messages is defined by its Discontinuous Reception (DRX)
cycle1 [11], whose length is negotiated between the device
and the BS.
Additionally, the Power Saving Mode (PSM) [11] feature
can be used, that allows devices to enter a deep sleep state,
and operate with power consumption close to power-off. The
PSM has longer cycles than DRX, but the device is not reach-
able by the network during a PSM cycle. At the end of it, the
device is required to follow the Tracking Area Update (TAU)
process, to inform the network about its presence, and its
short availability to receive network-originated data.
1Here we refer to both DRX and extended DRX (eDRX), as their func-
tionality is the same. Also note that the DRX cycle can also be used during
the active waiting period (referred to as connected mode DRX (C-DRX), to
further reduce the energy consumption.
2.2 3GPP Optimizations for NB-IoT Device
Energy Savings
To better accommodate battery constrained NB-IoT de-
vices, 3GPP has specified both Control Plane (CP) and User
Plane (UP) optimizations [11]. In the CP optimization, the
devices encapsulate application data in control messages and
transmit them over their SRBs, avoiding the need to setup a
new DRB at each connection, essentially skipping the At-
tach process. Although the support for the CP optimization
is mandatory, the use of the SRBs limits the size of the data
that can be encapsulated, and as such, it can only be used
for small data transmissions. Additionally, the QoS of the
data transmission is upper bounded by the QoS that can be
supported by the SRBs, which might be unsatisfactory to the
device application. Finally, the transmission of application
data in control messages does not allow for encryption of the
transmitted data. Therefore, to accommodate larger packet
transmissions, better QoS and secure transmissions, 3GPP
also defines UP optimization according to which a device’s
pre-established connection can be suspended and resumed
with fewer control messages [10]. Essentially, the network
retains control information about the pre-established connec-
tion, which can be used when the device wishes to transmit
new data, without the need to setup new SRBs. However,
a new DRB still needs to be set up for the transmission of
the application data, as this is not retained from the device’s
previous connection.
2.3 Security Framework in Cellular Networks
The security framework used in NB-IoT is inherited from
4G and 5G networks [14], and provides processes for mu-
tual authentication between the device and the network, and
establishment of the device’s security context (SC), to be
used in subsequent communications [14] for data integrity
and confidentiality. The SC is derived from a unique, user-
specific root key K that is stored only on the device, and the
core network entity responsible for user authentication. As
there exists a one-to-one mapping between the device’s glob-
ally unique International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI),
and its key K, the robustness of the security framework relies
on the assumption that K will not be disclosed to or stolen by
unauthorized parties.
Each time a device establishes a new connection
(Sec. 2.1), the network checks for its SC if any (i.e. the
device has previously connected, and its SC has not ex-
pired). If none exists, the network requests the device’s
IMSI to identify it, and retrieve its K key. Next, the de-
vice and the network mutually authenticate each other, and
setup a hierarchy of keys and encryption algorithms for sub-
sequent communications. The network can request a device
re-authentication as often as it wishes [14], even if the device
is already connected to the network. In some cases, the net-
work is even obliged to delete the device’s SC, and request a
re-authentication at the device’s next connection (e.g. during
the TAU process).
2.4 Identity Privacy Mechanism
The IMSI is an important identifier that allows a device to
access the network when no other information is available.
As the IMSI is transmitted unencrypted, it is susceptible to
spoofing. Having gained access to the IMSI, a malicious
actor can launch a range of attacks, such as user-targeted
DoS attacks [26, 28, 29], and leaking of user location his-
tory [18, 24, 46]. Therefore, 3GPP recently proposed the
Identity Privacy Mechanism (IPM) [14] to protect against
leaking of the IMSI to malicious eavesdroppers.
Specifically, the IPM is based on a public-key infrastruc-
ture (PKI), where the IMSI is sent encrypted, using a com-
bination of public key generation with Diffie-Hellman and
symmetric encryption. To transmit its IMSI, a device first
generates a pair of ephemeral private-public keys using the
home network’s public key, which is permanently stored on
the device, similarly to the root key K, and any algorithm
mutually supported by both the network and the device (e.g.
RSA [27]). The device then uses the Diffie-Hellman algo-
rithm to generate a second ephemeral key using the home
network’s public key and its previously generated ephemeral
private key. This second ephemeral key is then used to en-
crypt the IMSI with a symmetric algorithm, such as AES. To
avoid replay attacks, 3GPP specifies that new keys must be
generated for each IMSI transmission.
3 Device Energy Consumption Measurements
3.1 Experimental Setup
Initially, we measure the energy consumption of three
popular NB-IoT development kits (GPy from Pycom (device
A) [40], BC95 from Quectel (device B) [41] and SARA-N2
from Sodaq (device C) [48]), henceforth referred to as de-
vices A, B and C. Note that the devices B and C require a
separate Micro-Controller Unit (MCU) to operate. For this,
we used an Arduino Uno board [16], as, at the time of writ-
ing, it is the one with the lowest power consumption among
the various Arduino MCUs. Device A was used with the
MCU unit of its vendor [39]. In order to get accurate power
consumption measurements for the various operations, we
switched off all LEDs at boot time (on all devices), and any
WiFi/Bluetooth features if available.
To measure the energy consumption of the different net-
work processes (RA, Attach etc.) we used the E7515A UXM
Wireless Test Set [31] by Keysight Technologies, which im-
plements a fully compliant NB-IoT base station (BS). In
terms of the NB-IoT configuration, the UXM box was set
to use an in-band deployment over a 10MHz channel, with
15KHz subcarrier spacing and QPSK/BPSK modulation in
the downlink/uplink respectively. We also assumed a normal
coverage level. For operations outwith the actual commu-
nication (e.g., message generation, key generation, encryp-
tion etc.), we used a Power Monitor (FTA22J) [38] from
Monsoon Solutions. The devices were powered through the
Power Monitor, using a USB cable which was configured to
only supply power.
In these experiments we measure the energy consumption
while the devices are in any of the three performance states:
(i) light sleep, (ii) deep sleep and (iii) working. The light and
deep sleep states correspond to the idle and PSM states of
3GPP [12] respectively (Sec. 2.1), and reflect the states when
the device has limited or almost no energy consumption. The
working state is the state during which the device generates
data and communicates with the network. For this state, we
separately measure the (a) RA process, (b) Attach process
(for cases when CP optimization is not used), (c) exchange of
application data (including any required scheduling requests,
reception of control data for ACK, encryption/decryption)
(for cases when CP optimization is not used), (d) IMSI en-
cryption (Sec. 2.4)), and (e) active waiting with C-DRX of
10 and 30-second IT. For these measurements, we assume a
NB-IoT specific traffic pattern, where devices send 200 bytes
of application data and receive a 140 bytes acknowledgement
every 5 minutes. We consider a broad range of traffic patterns
in subsequent sections.
Strong encryption mechanisms can be very expensive for
NB-IoT devices in terms of energy consumption, so the
choice of security procedures can make a significant dif-
ference on their battery life. For symmetric encryption
we measured the power consumption of the EEA1/EIA1,
EEA2/EIA2 and EEA3/EIA3 algorithms which are recom-
mended by 3GPP [7], and are based on the SNOW3G, AES,
and ZUC algorithms respectively. For the IMSI encryption,
we follow the approach of [26] and use the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange algorithm implementing a Curve25519 ellip-
tic curve. To generate asymmetric keys, we used public
implementations of the popular RSA and El-Gamal algo-
rithms [1, 2] with 1024-bit keys for both. Each data point
in our results is the average of 10 different runs.
3.2 Results
We first measure the average power consumption during
the three operational states (Fig. 2), assuming a complete
connection cycle (i.e. connection establishment, data ex-
change, active waiting, light sleep and deep sleep). Over-
all, all three devices have similar power usage in the work-
ing state, with major differences occurring in the deep sleep
state. As expected, the energy consumption in the working
state can be orders of magnitude greater than the other two
states. Perhaps surprisingly, although the light sleep state is
more energy-efficient than the working state, it still uses 3
orders of magnitude more power than the deep sleep state.
This indicates that in cases where latency for network origi-
nated data is not critical, there would be substantial gains if
the devices switched to the deep sleep state earlier (Sec. 5).
We then examine the energy consumption of the op-
erations related to the security framework. 3GPP allows
for alternatives for both symmetric and asymmetric encryp-
tion [14], and as such, we examine the energy consumption
of the three recommended symmetric encryption algorithms
(Fig. 3), and two popular asymmetric encryption algorithms
(El-Gamal, RSA) (Fig. 4) in isolation (Sec. 2). For reference,
we also measured the energy required for the Diffie-Hellman
protocol. We observe that among the symmetric algorithms,
EEA2/EIA2 is the most energy efficient, followed closely by
EEA3/EIA3. When comparing the asymmetric algorithms,
El-Gamal is more efficient for decryption and key generation
but is significantly more expensive for encryption compared
to RSA. As only the key generation part of these algorithms
(Sec. 2.4) is used, El-Gamal emerges as the most efficient
choice.
We further examine the energy consumption of the var-
ious operations in the working state (Fig. 5) to get insight
on potential areas for improvement. For this experiment,
Figure 2. Power consumption (in Watts) with different
devices in different operational states.
Figure 3. Energy consumption of symmetric encryption
algorithms.
Figure 4. Energy consumption of asymmetric encryption
algorithms that can be used for the IMSI encryption.
Figure 5. Energy consumption for various operations in
the working state. For active waiting, we show the en-
ergy consumption with different values for IT: 10 and 30
seconds.
we used the EEA2/EIA2 algorithm for symmetric encryp-
tion and integrity protection and the El-Gamal algorithm for
the IMSI encryption (Sec. 2.3), as these yielded the low-
est energy cost. Notably, our results show that the energy
consumption values on real devices are considerably greater
compared to the values considered by 3GPP for NB-IoT [3],
based on which the 10 year life goal was set.
When looking at each operation individually, we see that
the energy consumption for the actual data transmission and
reception is orders of magnitude lower than that for opera-
tions like the RA, Attach and Active Waiting. This is also
reflected in the pie chart (Fig. 6) showing the proportion of
time taken for different operations in the working state with a
10s IT. Please not that the time proportion is the same for all
examined devices. In this experiment we have excluded the
IMSI encryption as it is very expensive for NB-IoT devices
and can dominate the time spent in the working state. Cru-
cially, these results show that a holistic and fine-grained view
of NB-IoT device energy consumption characterization leads
to significantly different battery life estimates compared to
prior works [34, 15]. In section 5, we account for the sig-
nificance of the various operations towards optimizing the
overall device energy consumption.
4 Battery Life Estimation Analysis
In this section we build on the energy consumption mea-
surements from the previous section towards a realistic bat-
tery life estimation of NB-IoT devices. To this end, we first
model the energy consumption for a connection cycle. Then,
we use our energy model and realistic traffic patterns [32]
to simulate the overall energy consumption. This allows us
to take into account factors such as collisions during the RA
process, and gives us a realistic estimate of the energy con-
sumption outside lab conditions.
4.1 Energy Consumption Model
We define P as the time period between two succes-
sive instances that a device wished to transmit data. Then,
the total energy consumption for a single period P is Ep =
Figure 6. Pie chart showing proportion of time spent for
different operations in the working state (excluding IMSI
encryption).
Ew +El +Ed , where Ew, El and Ed is the energy spent in the
working, light sleep and deep sleep states, respectively.
The energy consumption in the working state Ew is equal
to Ew = ERA + EAt + Eapp + EAW . Here ERA is the energy
consumption for the completion of the RA process. This can
in turn be defined as: ERA = εRA ∗R, where εRA represents
the energy consumption of an RA process without collisions
and R means the average number of connection attempts re-
quired to complete the RA process. EAt is the average energy
consumption required for completion of an Attach process
(when the CP optimization is not used), which is specified
to be at most 15 seconds [11]. Eapp is the total energy con-
sumed for the transmission and reception of application data,
including the data generation, scheduling requests, genera-
tion and appendage of the required headers, and transmis-
sion/reception including all repetitions. Finally, EAW is the
energy consumed in active waiting.
El is equal to El = tlUl , where Ul is the average power
usage in the light sleep state, and tl is the time spent in
the light sleep state during a period P. Similarly, Ed equals
Ed =(P−tl−tw)∗Ud +ETAU , where Ud is the average power
usage in the deep sleep, and tw is the time spent in the work-
ing state during a period P. ETAU is the energy consumed
during the TAU process that is executed at the end of the
PSM cycle. It can be defined as ETAU = ERA + 2εT x + εRx
where εT x and εRx is the energy consumption required for
the transmission and reception of the messages for the TAU.
The ERA is also included, as devices must first go through the
RA process.
Given the above, the overall energy consumption of a de-
vice during the course of a day is the total of the energy
consumption of all periods in that day, and the energy con-
sumption of the IMSI encryption. Please note that the latter
depends on the deletion frequency of the SC.
4.2 Simulation Setup
In these experiments we use a custom simulator written
in Matlab, which follows the current 3GPP specifications in
detail, and implements the same procedures to the ones of
Variable Value
UE Tx power on NPUSCH Based on 16.2.1.1.1 [9])
Num of subcarriers 12
UE Tx power on NPRACH Based on 16.3.1 [9]
Time spent in NPUSCH 0.93 ms
Time spent in NPDCCH 0.22 ms
C-DRX cycle 2.56 s
I-DRX cycle 5.24 s
PSM Duration dev IAT/5 or
random PSM
Subcarrier spacing (KHz) 15
Coverage Levels Normal / Robust / Extreme
NPDCCH repetitions 1 / 1024 / 2048
NPDSCH repetitions 1 / 1024 / 2048
NPUSCH repetitions 2 / 64 / 128
NPRACH repetitions 2
NPDCCH periodicity TNPDCCH = RMAX ∗G [9]
RMAX = 1
G = 32
RACH periodicity 40 ms [13]
Table 1. Simulation configuration parameters
real deployments. For any optimizations, we altered the cur-
rent procedures to incur the minimum changes possible. Our
simulations are based on our energy model (Sec. 4.1), and
follow realistic traffic patterns for a NB-IoT cell in a dense
urban environment [21, 45]. Specifically, we simulate 50000
devices uniformly distributed in a 500m radius cell, which is
considered a typical-sized urban cell. We assume that 80%
of the devices are periodic with variable inter-arrival times
(IATs) (i.e., application periodicities), ranging from 5 min-
utes to 24 hours, while the remaining 20% devices are event-
driven. In each connection, devices transmit a single appli-
cation packet of 200 bytes, and receive an application ACK
of 140 bytes (based on [21]). We also assume that devices
employ the CP optimization (Sec. 2), unless explicitly stated
otherwise. In terms of network configuration our parameters
are summarized in table 1.
In all of our experiments we used the most energy-
efficient configuration, to set up a lower limit for the required
battery capacity. We use the EEA3/EIA3 for symmetric en-
cryption, and the El-Gamal for asymmetric key generation
(Sec. 3). We assume a 10-seconds IT for the active wait-
ing, during which devices apply C-DRX (Sec. 2) with 2.56-
seconds cycle. After the expiration of the IT, devices switch
to the light sleep state (idle) for 2 minutes and apply I-DRX.
We also assume that the PSM feature is enabled. For pe-
riodic devices, we assume that the PSM duration is 1/5 of
their IAT, for all IAT values with the exception of 5-min (for
which PSM feature is not applicable). For event-driven de-
vices, we assume a randomly generated PSM duration of up
to 120 minutes. For all devices, we setup a new security con-
text (SC) on their initial network attach using an encrypted
IMSI (Sec. 2.3) and assume that is never deleted. Note that
we do not include possible SC renewals, that would require
the generation of asymmetric keys for the IMSI encryption,
as this feature is currently optional for NB-IoT. Including
that feature would only add to the battery drainage so our
analysis should be seen to provide an upper limit on the bat-
tery life.
4.3 Results
Fig. 7 shows the estimated energy consumption for vari-
ous most common IoT IATs [21, 45], and different coverage
levels. Our results deviate from the battery cost or lifetime
targeted by 3GPP. If we consider the most efficient device C,
our results also show that for 5-minute IAT, the minimum ca-
pacity needed is≈ 88 Wh, while a 30-min IAT would require
a battery of≈ 30 Wh capacity. These higher battery capacity
requirements come at the expense of increased cost, and far
exceed the overall cost goal of $5 per device that was set by
3GPP [4] – at the time of writing we found the cost of the
cheapest batteries with ≈ 90Wh and ≈ 30Wh capacities to
be ≈$45 and ≈$30, respectively. To meet the specified cost
and battery lifetime requirements, only devices with much
shorter IATs can be accommodated (3-h or higher IAT for
the above example).
Overall, shorter IATs require frequent connections that
consume significantly more energy as the devices need to
frequently establish a connection (Sec. 2.1) and get in the
working state, which has a significant energy cost (Sec. 3).
On the other hand, as the IAT increases, the devices spend
increasingly more time in the more efficient deep sleep
state (Fig. 8) with a significantly lower energy consumption.
When in deep sleep state, a device mainly consumes energy
to perform the TAU process at the end of each PSM cycle.
As such it is imperative that this is taken into account in the
energy consumption model. In Fig. 9, we see that the model
of [15] significantly underestimates the energy consumption
of the device, for example leading to an underestimation of
energy consumption by around 45% for 24-h IAT and nor-
mal coverage level. These results indicate that optimizing
the TAU process would have the greatest impact in the bat-
tery life of devices with long IATs. Conversely, for devices
with shorter IATs, minimizing the time spent in the working
state and switching faster to the more efficient light sleep
state would bring a noticeable difference.
5 Energy Optimization Mechanisms
Our device measurements (Sec. 3) show that the active
waiting, IMSI encryption and Attach/RA processes are most
energy consuming operations in the working state. There-
fore, in this section we propose a set of novel mechanisms
to optimize their energy consumption to increase the battery
life expectancy. Furthermore, we present a guideline of best
practices for device manufacturers and network operators,
and quantitatively measure their impact on the overall energy
consumption. For fair comparison, we assume a baseline that
corresponds to current and unoptimized 4G/5G procedures.
Please note that we only consider the device C and normal
coverage level for better clarity, however, the same trends
can be observed for the other coverage levels.
5.1 Reducing RA Connections and Security
Context Renewal
As the RA process and IMSI encryption are two of the
most energy consuming operations, reducing their frequency
would bring significant benefit to the battery life expectancy
Figure 7. Energy consumption in 10 years for different IATs and coverage levels for devices A, B and C. Please not that
log-scale is used in both axes.
Figure 8. Proportion of energy spent on each state as a
function of the IAT.
Figure 9. Difference (%) of the energy consumption es-
timated by the model from [15] for different IATs rela-
tive to our model assuming normal coverage level and the
use of CP optimization. As the IAT increases, the energy
for the TAU process dominates total energy consumption
and increases the estimation error with the model from
[15].
of NB-IoT devices. Towards this end, we propose a mech-
anism that exploits the periodicity of IoT devices, to reduce
the frequency of these operations, without limiting function-
ality nor breaking backwards compatibility for event-driven
devices. Since the majority of NB-IoT devices are expected
to fall into that category [25], this would have a major impact
in practice.
First, we propose reducing the number of RA processes
by eliminating the TAU process at the end of a PSM cy-
cle. The TAU process is mainly used to refresh the Tracking
Area of the device, and to indicate availability to receive data
from the network. While the first point is necessary in mo-
bile, non-periodic devices as the network needs to be aware
of their location, that is not the case for stationary and peri-
odic IoT devices, as there is communication with the network
at fixed and predictable intervals. Therefore, by estimating
their IAT, the network can assume that their Tracking Area
remains the same as long as a transmission is not missed for
more than n consecutive periods. To notify the device about
network-originated data, we propose the use the paging pro-
cedure. As the PSM cycle is agreed between the device and
the network, its exact ending time is known to the network in
advance with millisecond accuracy, and can thus be used to
page the device efficiently. Furthermore, paging the device
is preferable in terms of energy consumption, as the RA pro-
cess will need to be followed only when network-originated
data really exist.
Second, we propose using the estimated IATs to decide
when to delete the device’s SC. Currently, the SC will be
deleted if it has not been used for a (relatively short) period
of time. As such, devices with long IATs may be forced to
perform IMSI encryption (if used) before every transmission.
A naive approach would be to simply increase the deletion
threshold to a much larger value, but that is sub-optimal as
the network would be forced to retain the SCs of periodic
devices with short IATs for longer than necessary. However,
similar to the Tracking Area refresh, we can assume that a
device is still operational as long as it does not miss more
than n consecutive periods. A similar approach can also be
adopted for event-driven devices. While we cannot use esti-
mated IAT in this case, these devices will perform the TAU
process at the end of each PSM cycle. Therefore, we can
use the length of the PSM cycle, and only delete the SC if
the device misses a TAU for more than n consecutive PSM
cycles.
5.1.1 Mechanism
Our mechanism exploits the lack of mobility of NB-IoT
devices, and reduces the number of costly and unnecessary
procedures, thus decreasing their energy consumption. At
the same time, it is able to accurately estimate when a SC
needs to be deleted to prevent stalling contexts from being
stored indefinitely, without increasing the energy consump-
tion of the devices.
In our mechanism, devices need to inform the network
whether they are periodic or not, but are not required to pro-
vide their actual IAT value. At their initial connection de-
vices register with the network using the existing RA and
Attach processes without any modifications. During the At-
tach process, the network questions the device regarding its
capabilities using the Capability Enquiry message. The de-
vice replies with the Capabilities Enquiry Response mes-
sage, which includes a new field indicating whether the de-
vice is periodic or not, which will prompt the network to esti-
mate its IAT using either its future transmissions for periodic
devices, or the agreed PSM cycle for non-periodic devices.
The new field can either be included in one of the message’s
existing extensions to retain backwards compatibility, or can
be added in its main body. On the device side, this can be ac-
complished with the use of AT commands which can be eas-
ily set by the application designer, or added with a firmware
update. The remainder of the Attach process remains un-
changed.
The network estimates the IATs as the running average
of the last y connections. The value of y is defined by the
network operator based on the storage capabilities and the
number of devices being served by the network. Specifi-
cally, the network estimates the IAT of the ith device at the
nth connection as si = 1y ∗ (tn−y + tn−y+1 + ...+ tn). Based on
the estimated IATs the network can determine an approxi-
mate time of the device’s next transmission/TAU, and adjust
its SC deletion time as: tdeletion = tnow + si ∗ (m + o f f set)
where m is the maximum number of missed periods allowed
and is determined by the network, tnow is the current time,
and o f f set is the IAT percentage that can be tolerated as
time offset. For this mechanism we consider that a value of
m = 0.5 is adequate.
5.1.2 Results
Fig. 10 shows the energy gains per period P (section 4.1)
of the device C. We can see that the proposed optimization
significantly benefits devices with large IATs, resulting in en-
ergy gains of up to 37.8% per period P. As these devices
spend most of their lives in the PSM state, the TAU process
in these cases adds an unnecessary energy cost that can be
avoided without impacting their operation.
5.2 Elimination of Random Access Process
The RA process is repeated every time the device con-
nects to the network, and considering the significant energy
cost of a single RA process, this accounts for a large part of
the overall battery consumption. The RA process serves two
Figure 10. Energy gains per period P for different IATs,
with and without our optimization based on IAT estima-
tion.
purposes: (i) receiving the TA information (Sec. 2.1) in or-
der to synchronize in the uplink, and (ii) receiving an uplink
grant for the following transmissions.
For highly mobile devices, getting a new TA at each con-
nection is necessary as it is likely to have changed from their
last connection. As NB-IoT devices are mainly stationary,
their TA does not significantly change between subsequent
connections, and changes in their environment (e.g. a pass-
ing car) do not have a significant impact on the signal prop-
agation delay, thus not affect their TA value. Therefore, we
propose a mechanism that omits the RA process for station-
ary devices, and provisions an uplink grant for their next
transmission. We do note however, that if synchronization
is lost for any reason, it can still be detected and corrected
using the existing TA update message. Further, in contrast
to the two-step RA process currently discussed by 3GPP for
Release 17 onward [5, 6] which aims to minimize the cost of
an RA process, our mechanism can eliminate RA processes
altogether (apart from the initial one), by exploiting the peri-
odic nature of most IoT devices to pre-schedule appropriate
grants in advance.
Our mechanism works as follows. On its very first con-
nection, a stationary NB-IoT device performs the existing
RA process without modifications to receive its correspond-
ing TA value. During the Attach process, the device informs
the BS whether it is stationary or not, using the Capability
Response message. Similarly to our first optimization, this
can be done either by introducing a new field in the exist-
ing message, or by using one of its extensions. After their
application data exchange, stationary devices retain their TA
value to use it again the next time they wish to transmit data.
The BS also retains the devices’ bearers (DRBs and SRBs).
In order to completely eliminate the RA process, station-
ary devices that re-use their TA values, need to have an up-
link grant for their next transmission. This can be sched-
uled by the network based on the estimated IAT (Sec.5.1.1),
Figure 11. Reduction in device energy consumption over
a 10-year period due to RA elimination for different
IATs.
which is used to calculate the correct System Frame Number
(SFN) and Hyper Frame Number (HFN) in the future that
the device will wake up and pre-schedule sufficient resources
then, adding a small number of frames to cover clock drifts
at the device side. The network informs the device about
its future scheduling of the Connection Release procedure.
As the elimination of the RA process removes extra delays
(e.g. due to collisions), such future resource scheduling is
straight-forward and accurate. If however the device misses
its scheduled resources, the existing RA process can be fol-
lowed to request new resources. However, as the bearers ex-
ist, the Attach process can still be skipped.
An important feature of the proposed mechanism is that
although the devices do not follow the RA and Attach pro-
cesses, the data can still be securely exchanged. Specifically,
as the scheduling of resources is device-specific, the BS is
aware of which device transmitted in what resources. This
means that the device can reuse its previously established se-
curity context to encrypt its data, and the network will still be
able to decrypt them. If required, the network can request the
renewal of the SC, which can be applied either to the current
transmission (i.e. the first transmission is rejected and the
device needs to repeat it after the renewal of the SC), or to
the device’s next transmission.
To assess the performance of this optimization we exam-
ine the reduction in energy consumption over a 10-year pe-
riod (Fig. 11). We can see that eliminating the RA process
further reduces the energy consumption compared to the cur-
rent procedure where no optimization is applied, regardless
of the device’s IAT. The greatest gains are observed when
short IATs are used, due to the increased number of connec-
tions they have to do throughout their lives, with a maximum
gain of 13.6%. Smaller, but still important energy gains are
also observed for longer IATs, with a 10.3% gain for a device
with a 24-h IAT.
5.3 Best Practices for Energy Reduction
5.3.1 Inactivity Timer & Active Waiting
Active waiting requires the second greatest amount of en-
ergy after the IMSI encryption. Since this feature was in-
troduced to limit the number of frequent connection estab-
lishments, it may not be required in NB-IoT where applica-
tions are expected to transmit all of their data in one go. Al-
though using the C-DRX can decrease the energy consump-
tion, forcing the devices to remain connected to the network
for a period of time after their transmission unnecessarily
wastes energy. Our results showed that even the use of the
shortest C-DRX cycle (0.32 seconds) can decrease the en-
ergy consumption by 22% and 38.2% for a 10-sec and 50-sec
inactivity timer respectively. Further gains can be achieved
as the C-DRX cycle increases.
3GPP has recognized the benefits of releasing a connec-
tion early and introduced the Release Assistance Indicator
(RAI) feature [8] as part of a series of optimizations in Re-
leases 14 and 15. The RAI is a new field included in control
messages to indicate that the device wishes to terminate its
connection, so that the connection release procedure can be
triggered immediately, reaching an energy gain of 98%.
It is important to note that this novel feature is not sup-
ported by older NB-IoT devices, and in fact our experiments
showed that two of the tested devices did not include it. Al-
though this feature can be added with a software update, ex-
isting applications also need to be updated in order to use it.
Furthermore, there is currently no support to allow the appli-
cation provider to inform the network whether outstanding
data exists [37], to avoid paging the devices shortly after they
released a connection. However, the energy benefits are sig-
nificant, and we believe that it is important that this feature
is enabled in both older and new NB-IoT devices.
5.3.2 Attach process
Similarly, the Attach process is costly, and needs to be
repeated at each network connection, incurring a significant
impact on the battery life of the devices, especially for de-
vices with short IATs. Therefore, 3GPP defines the Con-
trol Plane (CP) and User Plane (UP) optimizations [11]
(Sec. 2.2) to help reduce the energy consumption of NB-
IoT devices. Although these optimizations have some draw-
backs, we believe that they can contribute to the reduction
of the energy consumption, and therefore, we estimate their
energy gains if they are implemented (Fig. 12) using our sim-
ulator. Our experiments show that both approaches can de-
crease the energy consumption, especially for devices with
short IATs. Greater energy gains can be achieved when
the CP optimization is used, provided that the data size and
QoS requirements can be met by the SRBs. Specifically, the
UP optimization decreases the energy consumption by 2.9%
while the CP optimization results in an energy gain of 5.2%
when a 5-min IAT is used. For a 24-h IAT, the energy gain
drops to 1.2% and 2.2% for the UP and CP optimizations,
respectively.
5.3.3 Security Deletion Frequency
Although our proposed IAT optimization mechanism sim-
plifies the decision of when to delete a SC to prevent stale
contexts from being stored indefinitely and without incur-
ring extra energy consumption, it is a new proposal waiting
Figure 12. Energy consumption per period P with and
without the UP and CP optimizations for different IATs.
to be deployed, and operators must make a decision on when
to delete a security context. Therefore, here we provide an
evaluation of the energy consumption with 1-h, 12-h and 24-
h IATs, and a SC deletion frequency ranging from 1 to 24
hours, considering device C (Fig. 13). Please note that the
energy consumption includes all operations within a period
P (Sec. 4.2).
We can observe a significant difference between the 1-h
IAT and the other two, which is explained by the fact that
for the 12-h and 24-h IAT the device spends the majority of
its life in PSM. However, a device with 1-h IAT will seldom
be required to renew its SC, as usually the SC deletion times
in commercial networks are larger than 1 hour. This is not
the case for the 12-h and 24-h IATs that will be required to
renew their SCs more frequently.
5.4 Ablation Study
Finally, we compare the energy consumption per period
P for different IATs, using each of the aforementioned op-
timizations (either proposed by us, or by 3GPP), and their
combinations (Fig. 14). Here, we use a 10-second IT, with
5.12-second C-DRX cycles. As the IAT decreases, the en-
ergy consumption of the RA and Attach processes becomes
increasingly significant as they need to be repeated often.
Therefore, for short IATs, the 3GPP proposed UP/CP op-
timizations and our RA elimination based optimization pro-
vide the greatest gain. As the IAT increases, however, the en-
ergy consumption of the device starts being dominated by the
deep sleep state, which significantly reduces the effective-
ness of these optimizations. Instead, our IAT optimization
that targets the PSM/security renewal provides the most re-
duction in energy consumption (up to 46.14%). As these var-
ious optimizations are mutually complementary, they can be
combined to yield the greatest gains across the entire range
of IATs.
Figure 13. Energy consumption for 3 different IATs when
the SC deletion frequency ranges from 1 to 24 hours. De-
vices with short IATs will seldom be required to renew
their SC, while larger IATs introduce a notable energy
cost. We have enlarged the individual results for better
clarity
Figure 14. Ablation study of the estimated energy con-
sumption for different optimizations for device energy
savings and IATs.
6 Related Work
Device energy consumption has been a concern that influ-
enced the design of cellular networks, even more so since the
beginning of the IoT era (e.g., [30]). The DRX feature can
significantly contribute to the energy savings, and as such
a large number of works (e.g., [20, 33]) attempted to opti-
mize the DRX parameters of IoT devices, in order to increase
their sleep period, and thus decrease the energy consump-
tion. However, the energy consumed during a DRX cycle
is orders of magnitude lower than that of the RA or Attach
processes, and thus optimizing the currently used protocols
is equally important. Other works (e.g., [19, 50, 44]) use the
DRX settings, as well as information (e.g., the device capa-
bilities, the battery level), as a basis to efficiently schedule
data transmissions in order to achieve low power usage. Al-
though these approaches can synchronize when the device
checks for network-originated data with the times it needs to
send its own data, they do not optimize the currently used
procedures that incur a significant energy cost (Sec. 3).
Due to the large number of messages exchanged (either
control or data), several works (e.g., [36, 37]) attempted
to optimize the transmission parameters to decrease the en-
ergy consumption of IoT devices while in the working state.
While such changes can have a positive impact on the bat-
tery life, the major inefficiencies stem from the fact that the
protocols used were initially designed for HTC devices, that
present significantly different traffic characteristics. As such,
they are ill-suited for NB-IoT devices.
Until recently, works on energy consumption did not fo-
cus on a specific cellular network technology, and thus the
individual characteristics of the devices were not taken into
account. However, as such characteristics (e.g. periodic,
stationary devices) can make important difference, or pose
strict constraints (low-capabilities, cost limits), several re-
cent works have focused specifically on the NB-IoT tech-
nology. The works in [37, 22, 47, 49, 17] discuss the NB-
IoT technology in terms of energy consumption, analyzing
the different modes of operation and their associated energy
cost. However, they only measure the transmission and re-
ception operations, which are the least expensive operations
in terms of energy consumption (Sec. 3). As such, they do
not give enough insight into which areas require improve-
ment.
Similar to us, some recent works [34, 15] attempt to
model and experimentally measure the energy consump-
tion of NB-IoT devices. However, they differ to our work
in terms of scope and granularity of the measurements.
Both [34, 15] focus on measuring the energy consumption
of data transmission/reception as a function of different net-
work configurations (data rates, etc.) In contrast, our work
additionally measures the energy that the devices need to
spend for operations that facilitate these data exchanges (en-
cryption, communication with the core network, active wait-
ing etc.), which gives a better estimate of the overall energy
consumption of the device. Also crucially, [34, 15] are lim-
ited to modeling the energy consumption and do not assess
the impact and necessity of each individual operation, nor do
they propose improvements. Instead, we examine which pro-
cesses contribute the most to the energy consumption, and
propose appropriate protocol optimizations and best prac-
tices aimed at lowering the corresponding components of de-
vice energy consumption.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a detailed measurement-based
characterization of the energy consumption in real NB-IoT
devices, and identified expensive network operations that can
be the target for optimizations. Further, we presented an en-
ergy consumption model which we used in combination with
our measurements in a simulation study to estimate the bat-
tery requirements of NB-IoT devices to achieve a battery life
of 10 years. Our analysis showed that the current 3GPP spec-
ifications for NB-IoT that are largely inherited from 4G/LTE
and 5G are not efficient in NB-IoT if used unchanged. We
then proposed two optimization mechanisms that exploit the
traffic characteristics of NB-IoT devices to reduce the en-
ergy cost of unnecessary operations, thereby substantially
decreasing the overall energy consumption.
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